dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 · < 87c99a50e0fdc68a5b9b52a94d49452cd3ff02ca| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm mirror: fix integer overflow in create_dirty_log()
The argument count calculation in create_dirty_log() performs `*args_used = 2 + param_count` before validating against argc. When a user provides a param_count close to UINT_MAX via the device mapper table string, this unsigned addition wraps around to a small value, causing the subsequent `argc < *args_used` check to be bypassed.
The overflowed param_count is then passed as argc to dm_dirty_log_create(), where it can cause out-of-bounds reads on the argv array.
Fix by comparing param_count against argc - 2 before performing the addition, following the same pattern used by parse_features() in the same file. Since argc >= 2 is already guaranteed, the subtraction is safe.
From the CVE record · Linux
An integer overflow in the Linux kernel’s dm mirror dirty-log argument handling can bypass a bounds check. A user who supplies a device mapper table string with a parameter count near UINT_MAX can trigger out-of-bounds reads; the input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running the Linux kernel with dm mirror should check their kernel version; affected versions are not specified.