ZEBRA: Allocation Amplification in Inbound Network Deserializers
ZcashFoundation zebra
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| zebra-network crates.io |
|
|
| zebrad crates.io |
|
|
| zebra-chain crates.io |
ZcashFoundation zebra
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| zebra-network crates.io |
|
|
| zebrad crates.io |
|
|
| zebra-chain crates.io |
< 7.0.0
|
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.4.0, prior to zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and prior to zebra-network version 6.0.0, several inbound deserialization paths in Zebra allocated buffers sized against generic transport or block-size ceilings before the tighter protocol or consensus limits were enforced. An unauthenticated or post-handshake peer could therefore force the node to preallocate and parse for orders of magnitude more data than the protocol intended, across headers messages, equihash solutions in block headers, Sapling spend vectors in V5/V4 transactions, and coinbase script bytes in blocks. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.4.0, zebra-chain version 7.0.0, and zebra-network version 6.0.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Zebra’s inbound deserialization paths can allocate buffers against broad size ceilings before enforcing tighter protocol limits. An unauthenticated or post-handshake peer can cause a node to preallocate and parse substantially more data than intended.
Operators of Zebra nodes and users of zebrad before 4.4.0, zebra-chain before 7.0.0, or zebra-network before 6.0.0 should check their deployments.