rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Also unshare DATA/RESPONSE packets when paged frags are present
The DATA-packet handler in rxrpc_input_call_event() and the RESPONSE handler in rxrpc_verify_response() copy the skb to a linear one before calling into the security ops only when skb_cloned() is true. An skb that is not cloned but still carries externally-owned paged fragments (e.g. SKBFL_SHARED_FRAG set by splice() into a UDP socket via __ip_append_data, or a chained skb_has_frag_list()) falls through to the in-place decryption path, which binds the frag pages directly into the AEAD/skcipher SGL via skb_to_sgvec().
Extend the gate to also unshare when skb_has_frag_list() or skb_has_shared_frag() is true. This catches the splice-loopback vector and other externally-shared frag sources while preserving the zero-copy fast path for skbs whose frags are kernel-private (e.g. NIC page_pool RX, GRO). The OOM/trace handling already in place is reused.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's rxrpc DATA and RESPONSE handlers may decrypt packets in place when they contain externally owned paged fragments but are not marked as cloned. A local attacker may be able to reach this path by splicing data into a UDP socket and looping it back, potentially causing an out-of-bounds write. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Teams running Linux kernels with rxrpc should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.