libceph: Use u32 for non-negative values in ceph_monmap_decode()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ a5cbd5fc22d5043a8a76e15d75d031fe24d1f69c · < 08bc6173fd611ad5a40f472bf5f15b92aea0fe40| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Use u32 for non-negative values in ceph_monmap_decode()
This patch fixes unnecessary implicit conversions that change signedness of blob_len and num_mon in ceph_monmap_decode(). Currently blob_len and num_mon are (signed) int variables. They are used to hold values that are always non-negative and get assigned in ceph_decode_32_safe(), which is meant to assign u32 values. Both variables are subsequently used as unsigned values, and the value of num_mon is further assigned to monmap->num_mon, which is of type u32. Therefore, both variables should be of type u32. This is especially relevant for num_mon. If the value read from the incoming message is very large, it is interpreted as a negative value, and the check for num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON does not catch it. This leads to the attempt to allocate a very large chunk of memory for monmap, which will most likely fail. In this case, an unnecessary attempt to allocate memory is performed, and -ENOMEM is returned instead of -EINVAL.
From the CVE record · Linux
In the Linux kernel's libceph, ceph_monmap_decode() interprets a large unsigned monitor count as negative, allowing it to bypass a limit check. A crafted incoming message can trigger an unnecessary attempt to allocate a very large block of memory; the allocation will most likely fail. The input does not specify whether this requires network or local access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with libceph should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.