libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ cd1a677cad994021b19665ed476aea63f5d54f31 · < d82467c07b03a27c3c5469b62bb3b726305a80bb| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: define and enforce CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN
When decoding the key, verify that the key material would fit into a fixed-size buffer in process_auth_done() and generally has a sane length.
The new CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN check replaces the existing check for a key with no key material which is a) not universal since CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE has to be excluded and b) doesn't provide much value since a smaller than needed key is just as invalid as no key -- this has to be handled elsewhere anyway.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's libceph key decoder did not enforce a maximum key length before placing key material in a fixed-size buffer. An oversized key could overflow that buffer; the input does not specify how an attacker could supply one or whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with libceph should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.