ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 0626e6641f6b467447c81dd7678a69c66f7746cf · < 6b4f875aac344cdd52a1f34cc70ed2f874a65757| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix signededness bug in smb_direct_prepare_negotiation()
smb_direct_prepare_negotiation() casts an unsigned __u32 value from sp->max_recv_size and req->preferred_send_size to a signed int before computing min_t(int, ...). A maliciously provided preferred_send_size of 0x80000000 will return as smaller than max_recv_size, and then be used to set the maximum allowed alowed receive size for the next message.
By sending a second message with a large value (>1420 bytes) the attacker can then achieve a heap buffer overflow.
This fix replaces min_t(int, ...) with min_t(u32)
From the CVE record · Linux
A signedness bug in ksmbd’s SMB Direct negotiation can set an incorrect maximum receive size. A remote attacker can trigger a heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted preferred_send_size followed by a second, larger message. The input does not specify whether authentication is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with ksmbd should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.