ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 23193e513d1cd69411469f028d56fd175d4a6b07 · < cd2d765aa7157f852999842af32148128c735d39| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read
When reading an inode from disk, ocfs2_validate_inode_block() performs various sanity checks but does not validate the size of inline data. If the filesystem is corrupted, an inode's i_size can exceed the actual inline data capacity (id_count).
This causes ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_id() to iterate beyond the inline data buffer, triggering a use-after-free when accessing directory entries from freed memory.
In the syzbot report: - i_size was 1099511627576 bytes (~1TB) - Actual inline data capacity (id_count) is typically <256 bytes - A garbage rec_len (54648) caused ctx->pos to jump out of bounds - This triggered a UAF in ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
Fix by adding a validation check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to ensure inodes with inline data have i_size <= id_count. This catches the corruption early during inode read and prevents all downstream code from operating on invalid data.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s ocfs2 inode validation does not check whether inline data fits within its allocated capacity. Reading a corrupted filesystem inode with an oversized i_size can trigger a use-after-free while processing directory entries. The input does not establish whether an attacker needs local access, authentication, or user interaction.
Anyone running a Linux kernel with ocfs2 should check their kernel version; affected versions were not provided.