HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ cd6104572bca9e4afe0dcdb8ecd65ef90b01297b · < 0a3fe972a7cb1404f693d6f1711f32bc1d244b1c| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset()
The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution.
The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report.
Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
[bentiss: changed the return value]
From the CVE record · Linux
A memset() in the Linux kernel's HID event handling can lead to out-of-bounds reads and writes when an incoming event buffer is too small for its report. The input does not specify how an attacker could trigger this, whether authentication is needed, or whether user interaction is required.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected HID core code should check their versions; affected versions are not specified.