ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ c4d3efafcc933fd2ffd169d7dc4f980393a13796 · < 590f622669b97eaf7b57a1de7b0a6e68c5d8b2c3| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err()
Oskar Kjos reported the following problem.
ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data, a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE).
To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos.
Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5).
From the CVE record · Linux
In ip4ip6_err(), IPv6 packet metadata is mistakenly interpreted as IPv4 options. An attacker controlling packet data can cause an out-of-bounds copy into a fixed-size stack buffer when the error path sends an ICMP response. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected ip6_tunnel code should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not specified.