Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ b338d91703fae6f6afd67f3f75caa3b8f36ddef3 · < bda93eec78cdbfe5cda00785cefebd443e56b88b| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length
mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer.
Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s Bluetooth MGMT mesh send handler does not verify that the supplied advertising data matches its declared length. An attacker who can submit a truncated mesh send command may cause the asynchronous send path to read past the queued command buffer. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected Bluetooth MGMT mesh send handler should check their kernel versions.