Non-CA certificate accepted as intermediate issuer in public_key path validation
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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82af606b5437c4de1276dbcc8855a47e88231226Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert module) allows a non-CA certificate to be accepted as an intermediate issuer, enabling certificate chain forgery.
In lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl, pubkey_cert:validate_extensions/7 contains two flaws that together allow a certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension to be used as an intermediate issuer in a chain passed to public_key:pkix_path_validation/3: the cA:false clause recurses into the remaining extensions without rejecting the certificate when it is in issuer position, and the keyUsage check only fires when the extension is present, so a certificate lacking keyUsage entirely bypasses the keyCertSign enforcement.
Any party holding an end-entity certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension, issued by any CA in the victim's trust store, can use that certificate's private key to sign forged leaf certificates for arbitrary identities. public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 accepts the resulting chain, and by extension every TLS or mTLS endpoint built on the OTP ssl application that relies on the default verifier is affected, including server identity verification on the client side and client certificate verification on mTLS servers.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.19, OTP 28.5.0.8, and OTP 29.1.2, corresponding to public_key from 0.22 before 1.17.1.7, 1.20.3.6, and 1.21.8. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to public_key before 0.22, is affected is unknown.
From the CVE record · EEF
Erlang OTP public_key can accept a non-CA certificate as an intermediate issuer during certificate chain validation. An attacker who holds a certificate and its private key, issued by a CA in the victim’s trust store, can forge certificates for arbitrary identities if that certificate has basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension. TLS and mTLS endpoints using the OTP ssl default verifier can accept the forged chain; no user interaction is described.
Engineers running Erlang OTP 17.0 through versions before the applicable fixes in 27.3.4.19, 28.5.0.8, or 29.1.2, or the corresponding affected public_key releases, should check their deployments; the status of OTP before 17.0 is unknown.