ServiceAccount token disclosure via install-cni container logs
Tigera Calico
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/projectcalico/calico Go |
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| github.com/projectcalico/calico/v3 Go |
|
Tigera Calico
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/projectcalico/calico Go |
|
|
| github.com/projectcalico/calico/v3 Go |
|
| No fix yet |
In Calico, the install-cni init container logs the rendered CNI configuration to standard output. When the configuration template uses the __SERVICEACCOUNT_TOKEN__ placeholder (Canal/Flannel-Calico deployments), the installer substitutes the live Kubernetes ServiceAccount bearer token before logging, exposing the token to any authenticated user with pods/log permission in the namespace with calico-node. The token holds patch privileges on pods/status, enabling annotation-based attacks against cluster workloads. The default kubeconfig-based authentication path is not affected. This is a direct regression of TTA-2018-001.
From the CVE record · Tigera
In Canal/Flannel-Calico deployments using the __SERVICEACCOUNT_TOKEN__ placeholder, the install-cni init container logs the live Kubernetes ServiceAccount bearer token. An authenticated user with pods/log permission in the calico-node namespace can read the token and use its pods/status patch privileges for annotation-based attacks against workloads. The default kubeconfig-based authentication path is not affected.
Operators using Go package github.com/projectcalico/calico at versions >=2.0.0 <3.31.6 or <1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f, or github.com/projectcalico/calico/v3 at any version, should check their deployments.