zrok allows unauthenticated DoS via unbounded memory allocation in striped session cookie parsing
openziti zrok
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/openziti/zrok Go |
| No fix yet |
| github.com/openziti/zrok/v2 Go |
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openziti zrok
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/openziti/zrok Go |
| No fix yet |
| github.com/openziti/zrok/v2 Go |
|
|
zrok is software for sharing web services, files, and network resources. Prior to version 2.0.1, endpoints.GetSessionCookie parses an attacker-supplied cookie chunk count and calls make([]string, count) with no upper bound before any token validation occurs. The function is reached on every request to an OAuth-protected proxy share, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to trigger gigabyte-scale heap allocations per request, leading to process-level OOM termination or repeated goroutine panics. Both publicProxy and dynamicProxy are affected. Version 2.0.1 patches the issue.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
zrok's session cookie handling accepts an attacker-supplied chunk count without an upper bound on OAuth-protected proxy shares. An unauthenticated remote attacker can send requests that cause large memory allocations, potentially terminating the process or causing repeated goroutine panics; both publicProxy and dynamicProxy are affected.
Operators using github.com/openziti/zrok/v2 before 2.0.1 or the affected github.com/openziti/zrok package (versions through 1.1.11, with no fix available) should check their deployments.