Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer
electron
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| electron npm |
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electron
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| electron npm |
|
|
Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. From versions 39.0.0-alpha.1 to before 39.8.0, 40.0.0-alpha.1 to before 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-alpha.1 to before 41.0.0-beta.8, apps that pass VideoFrame objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the contextBridge are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged VideoFrame to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a VideoFrame object to the main world via contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld(). Apps that do not bridge VideoFrame objects are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 39.8.0, 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-beta.8.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Electron apps are vulnerable when a preload script passes a WebCodecs VideoFrame to the main world through contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld(). An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world, for example through XSS, can use that VideoFrame to access the isolated world, including Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps that do not bridge VideoFrame objects are not affected.
Engineers running npm electron versions >=39.0.0-alpha.1 <39.8.0, >=40.0.0-alpha.1 <40.7.0, or >=41.0.0-alpha.1 <41.0.0-beta.8 should check their apps.