PinchTab: OS Command Injection via Profile Name in Windows Cleanup Routine Enables Arbitrary Command Execution
pinchtab
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab Go |
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| github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab Go |
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pinchtab
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab Go |
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| github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab Go |
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PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.4` contains a Windows-only command injection issue in the orphaned Chrome cleanup path. When an instance is stopped, the Windows cleanup routine builds a PowerShell `-Command` string using a `needle` derived from the profile path. In `v0.8.4`, that string interpolation escapes backslashes but does not safely neutralize other PowerShell metacharacters. If an attacker can launch an instance using a crafted profile name and then trigger the cleanup path, they may be able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host in the security context of the PinchTab process user. This is not an unauthenticated internet RCE. It requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints, and the resulting command execution inherits the permissions of the PinchTab OS user rather than bypassing host privilege boundaries. Version 0.8.5 contains a patch for the issue.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
PinchTab v0.8.4 has a Windows-only command injection issue in its orphaned Chrome cleanup path. An attacker with authenticated, administrative-equivalent access to instance lifecycle APIs could launch an instance with a crafted profile name and trigger cleanup to execute PowerShell commands as the PinchTab process user. This is not unauthenticated internet remote code execution.
Teams running either Go package, github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab or github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab, at versions below 0.8.5 should check Windows deployments.