OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
|
| No fix yet |
Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification.
The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid.
This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 before OTP 27.3.4.10 and OTP 28.4.2, corresponding to public_key from 1.16 before 1.17.1.2 and 1.20.3, and ssl from 11.2 before 11.2.12.7 and 11.5.4.
From the CVE record · EEF
Erlang OTP's public_key OCSP validation does not verify that a designated responder certificate was signed by the issuing CA. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can forge a response marking a revoked certificate as valid. SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling may then connect to servers with revoked certificates; applications calling the validation API directly may also be affected.
Check deployments using OTP 27.0 before 27.3.4.10 or the affected OTP 28 line before 28.4.2, including corresponding public_key and ssl packages.