Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ fff3490f47810e2d34b91fb9e31103e923b11c2f · < 061ee71ac6b03c9f8432fe49538c3682bfcf4cf3| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state
The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved.
For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.
This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s Bluetooth SMP legacy responder path can mark a Short Term Key as authenticated based on the local service’s requested security level rather than the pairing result. During Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, a peer can have an unauthenticated key treated as authenticated if the local service requested HIGH security. The input does not specify whether additional authentication or user interaction is required.
Teams running Linux kernels with the affected Bluetooth SMP legacy responder behavior should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.