smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ bc3e9dd9d104ca1b75644eab87b38ce8a924aef4 · < b78db9bddc84136f6a0bb49e8883cf200dfb87a8| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate the whole DACL before rewriting it in cifsacl
build_sec_desc() and id_mode_to_cifs_acl() derive a DACL pointer from a server-supplied dacloffset and then use the incoming ACL to rebuild the chmod/chown security descriptor.
The original fix only checked that the struct smb_acl header fits before reading dacl_ptr->size or dacl_ptr->num_aces. That avoids the immediate header-field OOB read, but the rewrite helpers still walk ACEs based on pdacl->num_aces with no structural validation of the incoming DACL body.
A malicious server can return a truncated DACL that still contains a header, claims one or more ACEs, and then drive replace_sids_and_copy_aces() or set_chmod_dacl() past the validated extent while they compare or copy attacker-controlled ACEs.
Factor the DACL structural checks into validate_dacl(), extend them to validate each ACE against the DACL bounds, and use the shared validator before the chmod/chown rebuild paths. parse_dacl() reuses the same validator so the read-side parser and write-side rewrite paths agree on what constitutes a well-formed incoming DACL.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel SMB client does not fully validate a server-supplied DACL before using it to rebuild a chmod/chown security descriptor. A malicious SMB server can supply a truncated DACL that causes the client to read beyond its validated bounds during a chmod or chown operation. No attacker authentication requirement is specified.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected SMB client cifsacl code should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.