net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1d036d25e5609ba73fee6a88db01c306b140d512 · < 28324a3b62d9ce7f9bdd65a8ce63f382041d1b27| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s TPACKET transmit path validates a virtual network header in a memory-mapped TX ring, then reads it again later. A local userspace thread with access to that ring can change the header between validation and use, bypassing safety checks. The issue occurs when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected TPACKET transmit path should check their kernel’s status; affected versions were not provided.