usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 2b74b0a04d3e9f9f08ff026e5663dce88ff94e52 · < 6762f8a95772265dd0c2ffe7f400493f3115b135| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_ncm: validate minimum block_len in ncm_unwrap_ntb()
The block_len read from the host-supplied NTB header is checked against ntb_max but has no lower bound. When block_len is smaller than opts->ndp_size, the bounds check of: ndp_index > (block_len - opts->ndp_size) will underflow producing a huge unsigned value that ndp_index can never exceed, defeating the check entirely.
The same underflow occurs in the datagram index checks against block_len - opts->dpe_size. With those checks neutered, a malicious USB host can choose ndp_index and datagram offsets that point past the actual transfer, and the skb_put_data() copies adjacent kernel memory into the network skb.
Fix this by rejecting block lengths that cannot hold at least the NTB header plus one NDP. This will make block_len - opts->ndp_size and block_len - opts->dpe_size both well-defined.
Commit 8d2b1a1ec9f5 ("CDC-NCM: avoid overflow in sanity checking") fixed a related class of issues on the host side of NCM.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s USB gadget f_ncm component does not reject an undersized block length in a host-supplied NTB header. A malicious USB host can exploit the resulting bounds-check underflow to copy adjacent kernel memory into a network skb; the input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the USB gadget f_ncm component should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions are not specified.