ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ e2f34481b24db2fd634b5edb0a5bd0e4d38cc6e9 · < dfc6878d14acafffbe670bf2576620757a10a3d8| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate EaNameLength in smb2_get_ea()
smb2_get_ea() reads ea_req->EaNameLength from the client request and passes it directly to strncmp() as the comparison length without verifying that the length of the name really is the size of the input buffer received.
Fix this up by properly checking the size of the name based on the value received and the overall size of the request, to prevent a later strncmp() call to use the length as a "trusted" size of the buffer. Without this check, uninitialized heap values might be slowly leaked to the client.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s ksmbd component does not validate the EaNameLength value in a client request before using it as a comparison length. A network client might slowly receive uninitialized heap values as a result. The input does not specify whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Teams running the Linux kernel with ksmbd should check their exposure; affected versions are not specified.