usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ 1325f85fa49f57df034869de430f7c302ae23109 · < 906f16a836de13fe61f49cdce2f66f2dbd14caf4| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbip: validate number_of_packets in usbip_pack_ret_submit()
When a USB/IP client receives a RET_SUBMIT response, usbip_pack_ret_submit() unconditionally overwrites urb->number_of_packets from the network PDU. This value is subsequently used as the loop bound in usbip_recv_iso() and usbip_pad_iso() to iterate over urb->iso_frame_desc[], a flexible array whose size was fixed at URB allocation time based on the *original* number_of_packets from the CMD_SUBMIT.
A malicious USB/IP server can set number_of_packets in the response to a value larger than what was originally submitted, causing a heap out-of-bounds write when usbip_recv_iso() writes to urb->iso_frame_desc[i] beyond the allocated region.
KASAN confirmed this with kernel 7.0.0-rc5:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in usbip_recv_iso+0x46a/0x640 Write of size 4 at addr ffff888106351d40 by task vhci_rx/69
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 320-byte region [ffff888106351c00, ffff888106351d40)
The server side (stub_rx.c) and gadget side (vudc_rx.c) already validate number_of_packets in the CMD_SUBMIT path since commits c6688ef9f297 ("usbip: fix stub_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input") and b78d830f0049 ("usbip: fix vudc_rx: harden CMD_SUBMIT path to handle malicious input"). The server side validates against USBIP_MAX_ISO_PACKETS because no URB exists yet at that point. On the client side we have the original URB, so we can use the tighter bound: the response must not exceed the original number_of_packets.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel USB/IP client trusts the packet count in a RET_SUBMIT response, even when it exceeds the space allocated for the original request. A malicious USB/IP server can send such a response over the network and cause a heap out-of-bounds write on a connected client. The input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernel USB/IP clients should check their deployments; affected versions are not specified.