ksmbd: replace hardcoded hdr2_len with offsetof() in smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ e2b76ab8b5c9327ab2dae6da05d0752eb2f4771d · < 4cb537ae4f37d7d0f617815ed4bed7173fb50861| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: replace hardcoded hdr2_len with offsetof() in smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len()
After this commit (e2b76ab8b5c9 "ksmbd: add support for read compound"), response buffer management was changed to use dynamic iov array. In the new design, smb2_calc_max_out_buf_len() expects the second argument (hdr2_len) to be the offset of ->Buffer field in the response structure, not a hardcoded magic number. Fix the remaining call sites to use the correct offsetof() value.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s ksmbd component uses incorrect hardcoded offsets at some call sites when calculating response buffer sizes. The input does not specify what an attacker could do or whether exploitation requires network access, authentication, or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels with ksmbd should check whether their kernel is affected; no affected versions are specified.