xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
6.18.216.19.117.0In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: iptfs: validate inner IPv4 header length in IPTFS payload
Add validation of the inner IPv4 packet tot_len and ihl fields parsed from decrypted IPTFS payloads in __input_process_payload(). A crafted ESP packet containing an inner IPv4 header with tot_len=0 causes an infinite loop: iplen=0 leads to capturelen=min(0, remaining)=0, so the data offset never advances and the while(data < tail) loop never terminates, spinning forever in softirq context.
Reject inner IPv4 packets where tot_len < ihl*4 or ihl*4 < sizeof(struct iphdr), which catches both the tot_len=0 case and malformed ihl values. The normal IP stack performs this validation in ip_rcv_core(), but IPTFS extracts and processes inner packets before they reach that layer.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s IPTFS payload processing does not validate the length fields of an inner IPv4 header before processing it. A crafted ESP packet with an inner IPv4 total length of zero can cause an infinite loop in softirq context when its decrypted payload is processed. The input does not specify authentication requirements or user interaction.
Engineers running Linux kernels that use XFRM IPTFS should check their kernel versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions are not specified.