usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 144974e7f9e32b53b02f6c8632be45d8f43d6ab5 · < 8479891d1f04a8ce55366fe4ca361ccdb96f02e1| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_mass_storage: Fix potential integer overflow in check_command_size_in_blocks()
The `check_command_size_in_blocks()` function calculates the data size in bytes by left shifting `common->data_size_from_cmnd` by the block size (`common->curlun->blkbits`). However, it does not validate whether this shift operation will cause an integer overflow.
Initially, the block size is set up in `fsg_lun_open()` , and the `common->data_size_from_cmnd` is set up in `do_scsi_command()`. During initialization, there is no integer overflow check for the interaction between two variables.
So if a malicious USB host sends a SCSI READ or WRITE command requesting a large amount of data (`common->data_size_from_cmnd`), the left shift operation can wrap around. This results in a truncated data size, which can bypass boundary checks and potentially lead to memory corruption or out-of-bounds accesses.
Fix this by using the check_shl_overflow() macro to safely perform the shift and catch any overflows.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel USB mass storage gadget can overflow an integer when calculating the data size for a SCSI command. A malicious USB host can send a large READ or WRITE request that bypasses boundary checks and may cause memory corruption or out-of-bounds access.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the USB mass storage gadget should check whether their kernel includes the fix; affected versions were not specified.