Predictable DNS Transaction IDs Enable Cache Poisoning in Built-in Resolver
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
Generation of Predictable Numbers or Identifiers vulnerability in Erlang/OTP kernel (inet_res, inet_db modules) allows DNS Cache Poisoning.
The built-in DNS resolver (inet_res) uses a sequential, process-global 16-bit transaction ID for UDP queries and does not implement source port randomization. Response validation relies almost entirely on this ID, making DNS cache poisoning practical for an attacker who can observe one query or predict the next ID. This conflicts with RFC 5452 recommendations for mitigating forged DNS answers.
inet_res is intended for use in trusted network environments and with trusted recursive resolvers. Earlier documentation did not clearly state this deployment assumption, which could lead users to deploy the resolver in environments where spoofed DNS responses are possible.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/kernel/src/inet_db.erl and lib/kernel/src/inet_res.erl.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 26.2.5.19, OTP 27.3.4.10, and OTP 28.4.2, corresponding to kernel from 3.0 before 9.2.4.11, 10.2.7.4, and 10.6.2.
From the CVE record · EEF
Erlang/OTP’s built-in DNS resolver uses predictable UDP transaction IDs and does not randomize source ports. A network attacker who can observe a query or predict the next ID and send a spoofed response can poison the DNS cache; no user interaction is described.
Check deployments using the Erlang/OTP built-in DNS resolver on affected OTP releases from 17.0, including releases before the fixed versions 26.2.5.19, 27.3.4.10, and 28.4.2.