Request smuggling via first-wins Content-Length parsing in inets httpd
Erlang OTP
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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Erlang OTP
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
| No fix yet |
| Erlang OTP |
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e775a332f623851385ab6ddb866d9b150612ddf6Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request Smuggling') vulnerability in Erlang OTP (inets httpd module) allows HTTP Request Smuggling.
This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/inets/src/http_server/httpd_request.erl and program routines httpd_request:parse_headers/7.
The server does not reject or normalize duplicate Content-Length headers. The earliest Content-Length in the request is used for body parsing while common reverse proxies (nginx, Apache httpd, Envoy) honor the last Content-Length value. This violates RFC 9112 Section 6.3 and allows front-end/back-end desynchronization, leaving attacker-controlled bytes queued as the start of the next request.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 26.2.5.18, OTP 27.3.4.9, and OTP 28.4.1, corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.1.0.5, 9.3.2.3, and 9.6.1. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to inets before 5.10, is affected is unknown.
From the CVE record · EEF
The inets httpd module uses the first of multiple Content-Length headers, while common reverse proxies use the last. An attacker who sends a crafted HTTP request through a reverse proxy that interprets those headers differently can desynchronize the proxy and server, leaving attacker-controlled bytes to be parsed as the next request.
Operators of Erlang OTP 17.0 and later should check installations running inets httpd that have not reached the applicable fixed release: OTP 26.2.5.18, 27.3.4.9, or 28.4.1 (inets 9.1.0.5, 9.3.2.3, or 9.6.1, respectively); whether earlier releases are affected is unknown.