RDMA/irdma: Fix kernel stack leak in irdma_create_user_ah()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ b48c24c2d710cf34810c555dcef883a3d35a9c08 · < c9bd0007c4bdb7806bbd323287e50f9cf467c51a| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Fix kernel stack leak in irdma_create_user_ah()
struct irdma_create_ah_resp { // 8 bytes, no padding __u32 ah_id; // offset 0 - SET (uresp.ah_id = ah->sc_ah.ah_info.ah_idx) __u8 rsvd[4]; // offset 4 - NEVER SET <- LEAK };
rsvd[4]: 4 bytes of stack memory leaked unconditionally. Only ah_id is assigned before ib_respond_udata().
The reserved members of the structure were not zeroed.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s RDMA/irdma irdma_create_user_ah() response leaves four reserved bytes uninitialized. When a user address handle is created, those bytes are returned to the caller, disclosing kernel stack memory; the input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with RDMA/irdma should check their installations; affected versions were not specified.