Integer overflow in dynamic kernel object allocation allows user-mode threads to corrupt the kernel heap
zephyrproject zephyr
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject zephyr |
| No fix yet |
Original description
dynamic_object_create() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c computed the backing allocation for a dynamically allocated kernel object as obj_size_get(otype) + size, and for thread stack elements as STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) (a round-up plus fixed overhead), without checking either expression for unsigned wrap-around. A size close to SIZE_MAX makes the computed total wrap to a very small value, so the heap chunk handed out is a few bytes while the object descriptor is still tagged with the full requested type and registered in the kernel object table.
The size argument reaches that arithmetic directly from user mode. k_object_alloc_size() is declared __syscall in include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h, its verifier z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() in kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c is a bare pass-through, and z_object_alloc() only range-checks otype — nothing bounds size. The stack-element branch is additionally reachable through the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall via kernel/dynamic.c. Because subsequent kernel-object validation checks only the object's type and initialization state, the undersized handle passes K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT()/K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT(), and the matching init syscall (for example k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), or k_thread_create()) then writes a complete object over the truncated allocation.