{"schemaVersion":1,"url":"https://cve.openhack.com/cve/CVE-2026-16664","id":"CVE-2026-16664","title":"MCUboot out-of-bounds access in serial-recovery image upload","description":"MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_are","descriptionLong":"MCUboot's Zephyr serial-recovery upload handler bs_upload() in boot/boot_serial/src/boot_serial.c decodes the host-supplied image field of an MCUmgr image-upload request into img_num (a full 32-bit value) and latches it on the off == 0 packet without any range check. It then passes img_num straight to flash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot(img_num, 0), which on the Zephyr port resolves to __flash_area_ids_for_slot() in boot/zephyr/include/sysflash/sysflash.h and indexes the static const int all_slots[] table as all_slots[img_num  2]. That table holds only MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER  2 entries, so any img_num >= MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER is an out-of-bounds read.\n\nThe path is reachable by anyone with access to the serial / SMP recovery console, which is unauthenticated by design, and the bad value is supplied before any image signature is verified. The defect is specific to the default non-direct upload path (MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD disabled) on the Zephyr port with the array-backed slot layout (not CONFIG_SINGLE_APPLICATION_SLOT). It is not gated on a multi-image configuration: MCUBOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER defaults to 1, so even a default single-image build is affected for any image >= 1. The MCUBOOT_SERIAL_DIRECT_IMAGE_UPLOAD path is safe (its flash_area_id_from_direct_image() switch returns -EINVAL for unknown indices).\n\nflash_area_id_from_multi_image_slot() takes a signed int image_index while img_num is uint32_t, so the attacker controls the sign of the index as well as its magnitude: an image of 0xFFFFFFFE converts to -2 and reads all_slots[-4], off the front of the table, while large positive values read off the end (CWE-192). (0xFFFFFFFF itself is the \"no image given\" sentinel and selects image 0.) Either way the index multiply img * 2 is performed in int, so a wild offset yields a bus/hard fault, giving a reliable denial of service of the bootloader during recovery. For moderately out-of-range indices the read returns adjacent .rodata as a garbage flash-area id that is handed to flash_area_open(); this normally fails with MGMT_ERR_EINVAL, but if the garbage id happens to match a valid non-image partition, the subsequent erase/write can target a partition outside the image set (CWE-787). The attacker-supplied value is never echoed back, so there is no information disclosure. The fix is to reject img_num >= BOOT_IMAGE_NUMBER on the off == 0 packet, before the slot lookup. The comparison must be made on the unsigned img_num: an equivalent guard applied after the conversion to int would not reject the negative case above. __flash_area_ids_for_slot() should bounds-check its own arguments as defence in depth.\nThis vulnerability was reported independently twice: by NVIDIA Project Vanessa on 2026-06-22, and by Kai Phan (@kaimandalic) on 2026-07-19 as GHSA-8v33-88p6-jffj, which is closed as a duplicate of this advisory. Both original reports are reproduced in full below.","published":"2026-11-13T00:23:05.652Z","updated":"2026-11-17T21:01:06.157456439Z","reserved":"2026-07-22T19:47:54.908Z","status":"Awaiting Analysis","rejected":false,"assigner":"zephyr","metric":{"version":"3.1","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","rating":"medium","source":"zephyr"},"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","rating":"medium","source":"zephyr"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","rating":"medium","source":"zephyrproject.org"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","rating":"medium","source":"OSV"}],"rating":"medium","products":["mcu-tools mcuboot"],"affectedProducts":[{"vendor":"mcu-tools","product":"mcuboot","defaultStatus":"unaffected","versions":[{"version":"2.0.0","status":"affected","lessThanOrEqual":"*","versionType":"semver"}],"platforms":[]}],"packages":[],"cwes":["CWE-129"],"aliases":["GHSA-8rcq-2mgr-fhp8"],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/183a05f256bdbbac86edcb048958da59018f814e","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/b35d623fc44b873cbb244a4fb0930f259ff45eb8","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/commit/f30be48bcc58d18c22e61be914e8f7b380abcf53","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot/security/advisories/GHSA-8rcq-2mgr-fhp8","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/16xxx/CVE-2026-16664.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16664","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mcu-tools/mcuboot","tags":["package"]}],"patchReferenced":true,"fixAvailable":true,"exploitReferenced":false,"kev":false,"kevAdded":null,"kevDue":null,"kevEntry":null,"ssvc":{"exploitation":"none","automatable":"no","technicalImpact":"partial"},"epss":0.00125,"epssPercentile":0.0223,"sources":[{"name":"CVE List","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-16664","ok":true},{"name":"NVD","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16664","ok":true,"note":"Awaiting Analysis"},{"name":"OSV","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/CVE-2026-16664","ok":true,"note":"0 packages"},{"name":"CISA KEV","url":"https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog","ok":true,"note":"not listed"},{"name":"EPSS","url":"https://api.first.org/data/v1/epss?cve=CVE-2026-16664","ok":true,"note":"scored 2026-11-18"}],"aiTitle":true,"tech":[],"critical":[],"attention":null}