Dolibarr ERP/CRM account takeover in Universal Search filters
Dolibarr ERP/CRM
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Dolibarr Dolibarr ERP/CRM |
| No fix yet |
Original description
In Dolibarr before 24.0.3, dolForgeSQLCriteriaCallback() in htdocs/core/lib/functions.lib.php allows account takeover because it strips only a single table-name prefix from a Universal Search Filter (sqlfilters) operand before checking it against the forbidden-field denylist (pass, pass_crypted, api_key). MariaDB and MySQL accept a two-level qualification such as schema.alias.column, so an operand of the form dolibarr.u.pass_crypted survives the check and is emitted into the WHERE clause. A remote authenticated user holding only the holiday read and readall permissions, which confer no user-management or administrative access, can use the resulting boolean oracle at GET /api/index.php/holidays to recover any user's bcrypt password hash and api_key one character at a time, including an administrator's. Because api_key is accepted directly by the REST API as a bearer credential, this yields full administrative control of the application. This bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-89012, which added only a strtolower() call and did not address prefix depth. The same denylist also omits pass_temp, which stores a password in cleartext, as well as national_registration_number, salary, birth, address, personal_mobile and note_private.