Hickory DNS forged negative responses in NSEC3 validation
hickory-dns
hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 invert the relational operators in the wrap-around branch of find_covering_record() in nsec3.rs, so the last NSEC3 record in a zone's hash ring covers every hash except its owner. Attackers able to inject DNS responses can replay that NSEC3 record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses denying legitimate names.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
A comparison error in hickory-proto’s NSEC3 record handling lets the last record in a zone’s hash ring cover hashes it should not. An attacker able to inject DNS responses can replay that record and its RRSIG to forge DNSSEC-validated negative responses that deny legitimate names.
Check Hickory DNS deployments using crates.io hickory-proto >=0.25.0 <0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net >=0.0.0-0 <0.26.2.