Hickory DNS forged apex NODATA responses in NSEC3 validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25.0-alpha.3 through 0.25.2 and hickory-net 0.26.0-alpha.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in DnssecDnsHandle that accepts NSEC3-signed NODATA responses for zone-apex queries as secure without an NSEC3 record matching the hashed QNAME. On-path attackers or malicious authoritative servers can replay a validly signed non-apex NSEC3 with the zone's signed SOA to serve an authenticated (AD=1) denial of any apex RRtype for the negative-cache TTL.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
A DNSSEC validation flaw in hickory-proto and hickory-net can mark NSEC3-signed NODATA responses to zone-apex queries as secure without a matching NSEC3 record. An on-path attacker or malicious authoritative server can use a validly signed non-apex NSEC3 and the zone’s signed SOA to produce an authenticated denial of any apex RRtype for the negative-cache TTL.
Engineers using crates.io hickory-proto >=0.25.0-alpha.3 and <0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net >=0.0.0-0 and <0.26.2 should check their dependencies.