Hickory DNS DNSSEC validation bypass in mixed-class RRsets
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Hickory DNS hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 and hickory-net before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation bypass because verify_rrsets() ignores DNS class when partitioning RRsets, so non-IN records skip signature verification yet are marked secure when the IN records verify. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can include forged CH or HS class records, including DS records, to authenticate any DNSKEY and forge child zone responses.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
The affected hickory-proto and hickory-net packages can mark non-IN DNS records as secure without verifying their signatures. An attacker able to supply DNS responses can use forged CH or HS records to authenticate a DNSKEY and forge child zone responses.
Teams using hickory-proto versions before 0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net versions before 0.26.2 should check their deployments.