Hickory DNS forged NXDOMAIN responses in NSEC validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC handler that accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC records as proof of nonexistence for names below the zone cut. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker winning a port and TXID race can deliver one forged NXDOMAIN response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC records, causing authenticated denial of existing child-zone names cached for the negative TTL.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
The validating recursor in hickory-proto and hickory-net can accept signed parent-zone NSEC records as proof that names in a child zone do not exist. An on-path attacker, rogue parent nameserver, or attacker who wins a port and transaction-ID race can deliver a forged NXDOMAIN response, causing existing child-zone names to be cached as nonexistent for the negative TTL. No user interaction is required.
Operators using hickory-dns with hickory-proto before 0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net before 0.26.2 should check their dependencies.