Hickory DNS forged negative responses in NSEC3 validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Original description
Hickory DNS hickory-proto 0.25 through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain a DNSSEC validation flaw in the validating recursor's NSEC3 handler, which matches the closest encloser by hash alone without checking the type bitmap and so accepts parent-side ancestor-delegation NSEC3 records as proof of nonexistence. An attacker who delivers one response built from genuinely signed parent NSEC3 records can cause NXDOMAIN or NODATA to be cached with AD=1, denying resolution of existing names at and below the zone cut.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
References
- github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-624w-vvww-xvpw
- vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-dns-through-0.26.0-alpha.1-dnssec-validation-bypass-via-ancestor-delegation-nsec3
- github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/123xxx/CVE-2026-123595.json
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123595
- crates.io/crates/hickory-proto
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0532.html
- github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/889801333d7f18d59a4468100e8cd1859e083d43
- crates.io/crates/hickory-net
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0541.html