Hickory DNS forged NXDOMAIN responses in NSEC validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Hickory DNS hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 and hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 contain an NSEC validation flaw that returns a secure proof for NXDOMAIN responses when the covering NSEC's Next Domain Name is a strict descendant of the query name, which actually proves the name exists as an empty non-terminal. On-path attackers can flip the unsigned rcode of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing validators to accept forged nonexistence of the name.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
An NSEC validation flaw in hickory-proto and hickory-net can cause a validator to accept an NXDOMAIN response for a name that exists as an empty non-terminal. An on-path attacker can change the unsigned response code of a genuine signed NODATA response from NOERROR to NXDOMAIN, causing the validator to accept forged nonexistence.
Check deployments using crates.io hickory-proto versions before 0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net versions before 0.26.2.