Hickory DNS DNSSEC validation bypass in delegation proofs
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 fail to verify, per RFC 6840 §4.4, that an NSEC or NSEC3 record denying a DS RRset also proves the delegation's NS record exists. Attackers can reuse child-side NSEC or NSEC3 records to fake an insecure delegation and forge child-zone records.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
Affected hickory-net and hickory-proto versions do not verify that an NSEC or NSEC3 record denying a DS record set also proves the delegation's NS record exists. An attacker who can reuse child-side NSEC or NSEC3 records can fake an insecure delegation and forge child-zone records. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Check deployments using crates.io hickory-net versions before 0.26.2 or hickory-proto versions before 0.26.0-beta.1.