Hickory DNS forged nonexistence proofs in NSEC validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
|
|
| hickory-net crates.io |
|
|
Original description
Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 accept NSEC and NSEC3 records for DNSSEC nonexistence proofs when any other record with the same owner name passes signature validation. Attackers able to supply DNS responses can mix validly signed records with bogus same-name NSEC or NSEC3 records of different types in the authority section to forge nonexistence proofs.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
References
- github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/security/advisories/GHSA-57pw-897j-v4j6
- vulncheck.com/advisories/hickory-dns-0.26.0-beta.1-before-0.26.2-improper-nsec-nsec3-signature-validation
- github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/123xxx/CVE-2026-123590.json
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123590
- crates.io/crates/hickory-proto
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0550.html
- github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/68cb330eb7e73a7db0cec9a25888db9f4bcf2086
- crates.io/crates/hickory-net
- rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0557.html