Hickory DNS nonexistence proof forgery in NSEC3 validation
hickory-dns
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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hickory-dns
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hickory-proto crates.io |
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| hickory-net crates.io |
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Hickory DNS hickory-net 0.26.0-beta.1 before 0.26.2 and hickory-proto through 0.26.0-alpha.1 perform insufficient checks on NSEC3 record names during DNSSEC verification, comparing only the hashed label without confirming the record belongs to the correct zone. Attackers can supply NSEC3 records from another zone with a matching hash label to forge DNSSEC nonexistence proofs.
From the CVE record · VulnCheck
Hickory DNS hickory-net and hickory-proto insufficiently check NSEC3 record names during DNSSEC verification. An attacker who can supply NSEC3 records can use a matching hash label from another zone to forge a DNSSEC nonexistence proof. The input does not specify whether authentication or user interaction is required.
Check applications using crates.io hickory-proto versions before 0.26.0-beta.1 or hickory-net versions before 0.26.2.