compose-lint secret exposure in image-field findings
tmatens compose-lint
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| compose-lint PyPI |
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| tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Actions |
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tmatens compose-lint
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| compose-lint PyPI |
|
|
| tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Actions |
|
|
compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. From 0.22.0 until 0.32.0, compose-lint substitutes values from a sibling .env file into image fields and quotes the resolved value in CL-0004 and CL-0019 finding messages and fix text. In a workflow that writes secrets into that file and then lints untrusted pull-request content, an attacker can reference a secret variable so its whole value reaches the job log, JSON output, SARIF artifacts, and Code Scanning alerts. Fork pull requests normally lack secrets, so exploitation requires a secret-bearing workflow such as pull_request_target, same-repository branches, or a retained .env on a self-hosted runner, and the pass or fail result is unchanged. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Affected compose-lint versions substitute values from a sibling .env file into image fields and include the resolved values in finding messages and fix text. If a workflow writes secrets to that file and lints untrusted pull-request content, an attacker can reference a secret variable and expose its value in job logs, JSON output, SARIF artifacts, and Code Scanning alerts. Exploitation requires a secret-bearing workflow, such as pull_request_target, a same-repository branch, or a retained .env file on a self-hosted runner.
Check installations of the PyPI compose-lint package or tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Action at versions 0.22.0 through versions before 0.32.0.