compose-lint workflow-command injection in finding output
tmatens compose-lint
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Actions |
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| compose-lint PyPI |
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tmatens compose-lint
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Actions |
|
|
| compose-lint PyPI |
|
|
compose-lint is a Docker Compose security linter that identifies dangerous misconfigurations before deployment. Prior to 0.31.0, compose-lint prints attacker-controlled service names, environment keys, file lines, and other Compose text without neutralizing GitHub Actions and Azure Pipelines workflow-command openers. When a workflow processes a pull request, legacy ##[ commands or a line-leading double-colon command can create false annotations, hide log regions, mask selected strings, or invoke other commands recognized by the runner. The affected text report paths do not alter the compose-lint exit code or pass or fail result, but they can misrepresent the CI output presented to reviewers. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.0.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
Before 0.31.0, compose-lint prints attacker-controlled Compose text without neutralizing GitHub Actions and Azure Pipelines workflow commands. When a workflow processes a pull request containing that text, the commands can create false annotations, hide log regions, mask strings, or otherwise misrepresent CI output; they do not change the linter's pass or fail result.
Teams using the tmatens/compose-lint GitHub Action from 0.2.0 through versions before 0.31.0, or the PyPI compose-lint package before 0.31.0, should check their workflows.