hackney HTTP request splitting in CONNECT proxy authentication
benoitc hackney
benoitc hackney
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| benoitc hackney |
| No fix yet |
| benoitc hackney |
| No fix yet |
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.
The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.
This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
From the CVE record · EEF
hackney_http_connect does not check the value returned by a proxy_auth_fun callback before placing it in a Proxy-Authorization header. After a CONNECT proxy returns 407, an attacker-influenced callback value containing control bytes can add header lines to the retry request sent to the proxy. This requires the callback to derive its value from untrusted data, such as proxy challenge headers.
Engineers running benoitc hackney versions 2.0.0 through versions before 4.9.0 should check their use of proxy_auth_fun.