OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries
omnifaces
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
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| org.omnifaces:omnifaces Maven |
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omnifaces
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| org.omnifaces:omnifaces Maven |
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4.7.125.4.2OmniFaces is a utility library for Faces. In OmniFaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2, CombinedResourceHandler accepts a structurally valid deflated and base64 encoded combined resource ID without verifying that the server issued it. A forged ID can cause unbounded decoded output, add unique reconstructed IDs to a process-lifetime cache, or combine resources other than stylesheets and scripts. Because jakarta.faces.RESOURCE_EXCLUDES is not applied by this custom resolution path, a forged ID can disclose Facelets source from the webapp resource tree or META-INF/resources. In a deployment configured with the wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID that selects omnifaces.graphic can also cause a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch whose destination derives partly from the request Host header. The flaw does not provide arbitrary file read or establish arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF. The shared authenticity failure permits memory exhaustion and limited resource disclosure. This issue is fixed in versions 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, and 5.4.2.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
CombinedResourceHandler accepts forged combined resource IDs without checking whether the server issued them. A crafted request can exhaust memory or disclose limited resources, including Facelets source; it does not enable arbitrary file read. In deployments with wildcard CDN mapping, a forged ID may also trigger a blind, deployment-dependent server-side fetch.
Check deployments using Maven org.omnifaces:omnifaces versions before 1.14.3, 2.7.33, 3.14.23, 4.7.12, or 5.4.2 in their respective release lines.