the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199…
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Unspecified product |
| No fix yet |
Original description
An integer underflow vulnerability exists in the `nextstate()` function in `gpsd/packet.c` of gpsd versions prior to commit `ffa1d6f40bca0b035fc7f5e563160ebb67199da7`. When parsing a NAVCOM packet, the payload length is calculated using `lexer->length = (size_t)c - 4` without checking if the input byte `c` is less than 4. This results in an unsigned integer underflow, setting `lexer->length` to a very large value (near `SIZE_MAX`). The parser then enters a loop attempting to consume this massive number of bytes, causing 100% CPU utilization and a Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
From the CVE record · mitre