runc: LSM labels can be bypassed with malicious config using dummy procfs files
opencontainers runc
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/opencontainers/runc Go |
|
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| github.com/opencontainers/selinux Go |
opencontainers runc
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/opencontainers/runc Go |
|
|
| github.com/opencontainers/selinux Go |
< 1.13.0
|
runc is a CLI tool for spawning and running containers according to the OCI specification. In versions 1.2.7, 1.3.2 and 1.4.0-rc.2, an attacker can trick runc into misdirecting writes to /proc to other procfs files through the use of a racing container with shared mounts (we have also verified this attack is possible to exploit using a standard Dockerfile with docker buildx build as that also permits triggering parallel execution of containers with custom shared mounts configured). This redirect could be through symbolic links in a tmpfs or theoretically other methods such as regular bind-mounts. While similar, the mitigation applied for the related CVE, CVE-2019-19921, was fairly limited and effectively only caused runc to verify that when LSM labels are written they are actually procfs files. This issue is fixed in versions 1.2.8, 1.3.3, and 1.4.0-rc.3.
From the CVE record · GitHub_M
runc can be tricked into writing to unintended procfs files instead of its intended /proc targets. An attacker can trigger this by racing a container with shared mounts; the issue has also been verified with a Dockerfile using docker buildx build.
Teams running affected versions of github.com/opencontainers/runc (before 1.2.8, 1.3.0-rc.1 through before 1.3.3, or 1.4.0-rc.1 through before 1.4.0-rc.3) or github.com/opencontainers/selinux (before 1.13.0) should check their deployments.