mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
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≥ 1507f51255c9ff07d75909a84e7c0d7f3c4b2f49 · < 6f86d0534fddfbd08687fa0f01479d4226bc3c3d| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler
When a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with `memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the underlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file mapping.
If two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end up allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only one would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping. The task that failed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again and (b) putting the page back into the direct map. However, by doing these two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the allocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping.
If another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the kernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a supervisor not-present page fault.
Fix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s secret memory fault handler has a race when two tasks fault on the same page of a file created with memfd_secret(2). A concurrent allocation can then cause a supervisor not-present page fault if the kernel accesses that page through the direct map. The described conditions require concurrent local tasks; the input does not specify an authentication requirement.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the affected secret memory fault handler should check their kernel versions against the vendor advisory; affected versions were not provided.