tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus
Normally we wait for the socket to buffer up the whole record before we service it. If the socket has a tiny buffer, however, we read out the data sooner, to prevent connection stalls. Make sure that we abort the connection when we find out late that the record is actually invalid. Retrying the parsing is fine in itself but since we copy some more data each time before we parse we can overflow the allocated skb space.
Constructing a scenario in which we're under pressure without enough data in the socket to parse the length upfront is quite hard. syzbot figured out a way to do this by serving us the header in small OOB sends, and then filling in the recvbuf with a large normal send.
Make sure that tls_rx_msg_size() aborts strp, if we reach an invalid record there's really no way to recover.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's TLS receive handling can overflow allocated skb space when it retries parsing an invalid record under socket-buffer pressure. A network peer can trigger this by sending a header in small out-of-band sends, then filling the receive buffer with a large normal send. The input does not specify authentication or user-interaction requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with TLS receive handling should check their installations; affected versions are not specified.