vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: Validate length in packet header before skb_put()
When receiving a vsock packet in the guest, only the virtqueue buffer size is validated prior to virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put(). Unfortunately, virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put() uses the length from the packet header as the length argument to skb_put(), potentially resulting in SKB overflow if the host has gone wonky.
Validate the length as advertised by the packet header before calling virtio_vsock_skb_rx_put().
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel’s vsock/virtio receive path does not validate the length in a packet header before using it to extend an SKB. A host that supplies a packet with an invalid length could cause an SKB overflow in the guest.
Operators of Linux guests using vsock/virtio should check their kernels; affected versions were not specified.