habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
Linux
Affected versions
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
Linux
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Linux Linux |
|
≥ db1a8dd916aac986871f6b873a3aefad906f383a · < 33927f3d0ecdcff06326d6e4edb6166aed42811c| No fix yet |
| Linux Linux |
|
|
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another thread could close it. That's fine for the case when all we are doing is returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it). However, if we follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed by its ->release()), we have a UAF.
dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install(). habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the objects destroyed on close. In particular, it grabs an extra reference to another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours; that "will be" is actually "might have already been".
Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install() only when everything had been set up. As a side benefit, we no longer have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet; unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.
From the CVE record · Linux
The Linux kernel's habanalabs export_dmabuf() can access objects after another thread closes a newly installed file descriptor. A local attacker who can trigger the export and race the close could trigger a use-after-free; the input does not specify authentication requirements.
Engineers running Linux kernels with the habanalabs component should check their kernel versions; affected versions are not specified.